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"A New and Unwholesome Principle": American and British Influence on the
Turco-Greek Exchange Convention of January 30, 1923[1]
By Matthew Hacholski
Traveling across Anatolia during the Greco-Turk War, Arnold Toynbee lamented the atrocities he saw committed
by both sides. "Western civilization," he wrote, had brought about a "war of extermination between local
nationalities let loose by its own diplomacy."[2] In the fall of 1922, Western diplomats would attempt to rectify
st
their error at the 1 Lausanne Conference by seeking to bring peace between Turkey and Greece. Part of the
solution would be the first internationally condoned compulsory population transfer, the Turco-Greek Exchange,
whose formulation most historians have attributed to Turkey, Greece, and Great Britain alone. However at the
Lausanne Peace Conference, the American delegation also actively contributed to the creation of this exchange
convention, which served as a template for later forced population transfers.[3] In fact it was American pressure
rather than the "diplomatic skills" of Venizelos, the Greek Representative at the conference, or the "steamroller
tactics" of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon which led to the exclusion of the Constantinople Greeks from the
population exchange and to some degree, bears responsibility for its compulsory nature.[4]
The exchange convention has long been studied as part of diplomatic history.[5] Relying on diplomatic
th
communiqus and other government documents, as well as private memoirs, early 20 century scholars treated the
Lausanne Conference as the official end of the Ottoman age and part of the "maturation" process of the Middle
East.[6] Turkey's adoption of the nation-state model and membership in the League of Nations further encouraged
these old-style diplomatic historians to see the exchange as a historic, if regrettable, "great success," the first
forced ethno-religious transfer sanctioned by an evolving international community.[7] Some even felt this new
concept of compulsory exchange offered a viable solution to a Europe still-racked by ethnic strife.[8] Concurrently
in Greece and Turkey, the exchange and the entire Lausanne Conference were integrated into nationalist
narratives whose glorification of the nation and vilification "the other" often came at the expense of historical
accuracy.[9] As E.J. Hobsawn wrote, "historians are to nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroinaddicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market," and the past profuse use of this intellectual narcotic
on both sides of the Aegean makes the presentation of the exchange even by present Greek and Turkish historians
at times suspect.[10] Yet for contemporary scholars outside of Greece and Turkey, the study of the exchange has
shifted to the field of refugee studies. These researchers, such as Rene Hirschon, have examined exclusively the
social and cultural ramifications of the Turco-Greek population transfer.[11] While now conceptualized as part of a
larger phenomenon of population expulsions, the exchange is still seen as particularly important as it created "a
new type of refugee, stemming from the organization of a largely involuntary unmixing of people under the aegis
of international law."[12] While in the past diplomatic historians allowed the political dimensions of the transfer to
dominate their analysis, this new method of scholarship as one authority has warned, "runs the risk of reducing in
importance the role of the political and diplomatic process that led to [the exchange]."[13] Oddly, however,
historians from both diplomatic history and refugee studies have failed to notice the key American contribution to
what they have called "the most important" of all population transfers in modern history which this study
examines through the former methodology.[14]
As self-appointed Chairman of the Lausanne Conference and representative of the leading European power, Lord
Curzon had substantial influence on the drafting of the exchange convention and set the British position on the
population exchange. Under his leadership, the concept of population exchange would be presented to the
conference by a representative of the League of Nations, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, on December 1, 1922.[15] The British
Foreign Secretary specially chose the timing and presenter of the exchange. As the conference dealt with several
issues beyond the conflict between Greece and Turkey, Curzon first presented topics he believed the Allies and
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other neutral parties, including America, could agree on. He hoped this strategy, which encompassed the
exchange, would strengthen allied unity and isolate Turkey diplomatically.[16] Also, by having a renowned
philanthropist introduce the concept, it cast an aura of humanitarianism over the exchange while obscuring British
influence.[17] Because of international condemnation of the exchange's compulsory nature, not only the British,
but the Turkish and Greek delegations as well, attempted on multiple occasions during the conference to disavow
their role in fathering the concept while American diplomats made no attempt to draw attention to their role in
the negotiations.[18] This diplomatic "distancing" may in part explain why the American contribution to the
exchange through Constantinople's exemption has been previously unexamined and why some have cited Dr.
Nansen as the sole architect of the exchange.[19]
After Nansen's introduction in which mention was made of a possible sub-commission to decide the matter, the
leading Turkish delegate, İsmet İnn, announced Turkey's intent to include the Greeks of Constantinople (modernday Istanbul) in the transfer.[20] Having emerged victorious from the Greco-Turk War, Turkey expected to dictate
many of the peace terms, including the exchange. In reply to Ismet's position on Constantinople, Curzon
commented that he "hoped that the sub-commission, if set up, would consider the desirability of persuading the
Turkish Government to keep the Greek population of Constantinople."[21] Thus, while Curzon "hoped" the
Constantinople Greeks would be exempt from the transfer, he expected the sub-commission to persuade the
Turkish delegation, as he wanted to discuss issues that were more relevant to British interests in the conference's
main commission. Curzon's only attempt to dissuade Turkish delegates that day from including Constantinople was
to remind them that Constantinople's Greeks were "vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city of
commerce and industry."[22]
After İsmet İnn declared Turkey's position, the head Greek delegate Venizelos did not obstinately oppose the
inclusion of Constantinople within the exchange. This is as representing a defeated nation in political turmoil and
flooded with refugees, Venizelos had little besides personal charisma with which to resist Turkish demands.[23] He
also faced a precedent of previous Greek passiveness in diplomacy set during Mudania, the armistice of the GrecoTurk War. Negotiated on a pier jutting into the Aegean Sea at Mudania, allied representatives from France, Italy,
and Great Britain brokered an end to fighting between Greece and Turkey. The overall allied commander, General
Tim Harington of Britain, took the lead in discussions with Turkish representatives as Curzon would later at
Lausanne. Unfortunately for Greece, the only Greeks present at Mudania were those floating decreased
underneath the pier, and thus the Greeks were compelled to accept an armistice that was literally dictated over
their heads.[24] In many ways, Lausanne was delegated in a similar manner with the Allies taking the lead in
negotiations with the newly formed state of Turkey while Greece, overwhelmed by its defeat, could comment little
on the proceedings including the exchange. However in this discussion Venizelos did note
"A special question arose as regards Constantinople. [He] could not allow that the thousands of Greeks who lived
there, with the addition of the numerous refugees from Thrace and Anatolia, should be obliged to leave that city.
Such an expulsion would amount to an unprecedented political, economic, and social catastrophe. If Turkey
actually insisted on such an exodus, the number of refugees in Greece would be so great that he would be obliged
to ask America, the great democracy of the West, to increase, for the benefit of the refugees, the percentage of
immigrants she was willing to receive"[25]
American diplomats present at the diplomatic table no doubt noted this suggestion with special interest. Should
the Constantinople Greeks be forced from their homes, the United States would probably be asked to take in tens
of thousands of them, making a matter whose outcome at first seemed of little relevance to the United States
possibly having quite palpable effects. The issue of Constantinople then had immediately risen as a point of
contention during the first discussion on the population exchange at Lausanne, which would require later
st
American intervention. Overall, there is no sign that Venizelos's or Curzon's statements on December 1 had any
effect on the Turkish delegation as afterwards they continued to insist on Constantinople's inclusion.[26] At the
conclusion of this meeting, the commission "decided that the question of the exchange of populations between
Greece and Turkey shall be examined by a sub-commission" while the American delegation now had to weigh the
seriousness of Venizelos's statement.[27]
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After this first discussion the next ten days of the conference, December 2 to December 12, were critical in the
formulation of the precise policy and goals of the population exchange in the sub-commission including the fate of
Constantinople. During those ten days, Curzon would not attend a single exchange meeting, giving him little
opportunity to influence the outcome of the exchange and greater leverage to the American delegation.[28]
Instead, Curzon, having chosen free transit of the Straits, the Dardanelles, and the Bosporus as the conference's
main topic of discussion, exercised all his diplomatic expertise in an ostentatious display of old-style diplomacy.
Ensuring Britain's merchant and naval fleets could travel unmolested from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea was
for the British Empire, as Curzon had concisely argued to the British Cabinet a month earlier, an essential
"Category A" concern.[29] The greater historical narrative of Great Britain sheds light on Curzon's decision to
ignore the question of exchange. During the three years before Lausanne, the British foreign secretary had found
himself futilely attempting to prevent the deterioration of British interests globally. In the aftermath of World War
I, diverse problems had manifested themselves across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, to which Curzon,
representing an empire exhausted of its resources, continuously failed to resolve in Britain's favor. The British
public viewed Curzon's seemingly endless diplomatic debacles with such distain that many London newspapers
demanded his resignation with one Times writer even resigning himself in protest.[30] In the fall of 1922, Curzon
came personally to Lausanne determined to win a diplomatic victory, not only to protect the interests of his
country, but also to save his floundering political career.[31] Yet he also knew that with Turkey's military triumph
over Greece and in an informal sense the Allies, Britain could only hope to achieve limited diplomatic objectives at
the conference. British access through the Turkish Straits was among these select interests, if not the most
important, while the maintenance of the Greek population of Constantinople ranked low. Furthermore, Curzon
hoped to use the Straits issue as a diplomatic tactic to drive a wedge between Soviet and Turkish diplomats,
another critical goal of the British at the conference.[32] With Communism on the rise and in an interesting
foreshadowing of Cold War politics, Curzon sought to prevent Turkey and the Soviet Union from forming a close
relationship while the Soviet delegation hoped to use the Lausanne negotiations to strengthen Turkey's ties to
Moscow.
On top of these pressing concerns, the British delegation, unlike the Americans had to entertain the possibility of
renewed hostilities with Turkey, which tempered any enthusiasm Britain could spare to hound Turkey over
minority rights in general; never mind preserving Constantinople's Greek population.[33] Only months before,
Great Britain and the Turkish Republic had come to the brink of war during the Chanak crisis and the Allies still
occupied Constantinople while Turkish military forces amassed nearby threateningly.[34] At the same time the
conference's delegates were discussing the exchange, Curzon openly warned the British commander of the
Constantinople garrison, General Harington, that at Lausanne, the "peace negotiations may break down," which
could lead to war once more.[35] With peace still tenuous, Curzon made a pragmatic decision by leaving
unattended the "Category B" issue of exchange as he devoted all his energies to dazzling his peers to achieve his
higher diplomatic priorities.[36]
Venizelos during those ten critical days did not attend the exchange sub-commission meetings either but
participated in the conference's main discussions on the Straits to uphold Greek prestige. Because of Greece's
weak political position, Venizelos contributed little to the meetings themselves as his attendance rather served a
vital symbolic purpose as it showed that Greece was still able to sit at the same table with Turkey and the Great
Powers. Venizelos sought only to protect Greek honor, an objective that on one well-recorded occasion provoked
a "dramatic incident" over a perceived slight to Greek dignity.[37] No mention of the exchange was made in the
conference's main commission until its meeting on minority issues held on December 12. In sum, the absence of
both Curzon and Venizelos from the exchange sub-commission in order to pursue other political goals from
December 2 to December 12 left a diplomatic void which allowed the American delegation to decisively contribute
to the population transfer by persuading the Turkish delegation to agree to Constantinople's exemption from the
exchange.
Initially, it appeared the United States would have little influence over the formulation of population exchange
policy. The Americans were officially only diplomatic observers at a conference where their attendance itself had
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been in serious doubt. However, when coming to Lausanne they did also possess a diplomatic precedent of
American intervention to protect the welfare of Greek populations under Turkish rule established during the
Greco-Turk War.[38] Yet, American Secretary of State Charles Hughes had left ambiguous the American position
on the exchange. In a detailed aide-memoire before the conference to the then tentative American ambassadors,
Hughes had noted that "the most feasible solution of the problem [minority protection] might possibly be an
exchange of Christian and Moslem minorities in Asia Minor and Greece."[39] He left the initiative to the diplomatic
triumvirate appointed by President Harding to the conference, Admiral Mark Bristol and Ambassadors Richard
Child and Joseph Grew, to decide if a population exchange including Constantinople best served American
interests.
In truth, despite their "observer" status, when the Americans entered into the Lausanne Conference in November,
they actively participated, including on the issue of exchange. As a non-aligned power, American delegates served
as trusted mediators when negotiations at times reached a standstill.[40] Behind closed doors, Allied, Greek, and
Turkish delegations jostled for American support and publicly encouraged American participation in
discussions.[41] As a seasoned member of the US Diplomatic Corps and the ambassador to Germany during WWI,
Ambassador Joseph Grew candidly recorded how quickly these maneuvers began stating "old world diplomacy is
by no means a thing of the past. We are running up against it every day."[42] He noted that while the British "took
tea" with the Americans and declared the two countries "ought to co-operate on every issue," simultaneously the
Turkish delegation engaged in secret negotiations with the Americans that revealed "some interesting features of
their [Turkey's] attitude."[43] Grew noted in his diary one of the major points the Turkish representatives privately
expressed to the American ambassadors was "in view of public opinion and sentiment of the [Turkish] National
Assembly," Turkish guarantees for minority rights could only be assured provided a "reduction of minorities should
be carried out [in Turkey]."[44] At the same time, the Turkish delegation made clear that the Ankara government
looked favorably to future American "participation" in the development of Turkish-claimed oil fields.[45] Early on,
the Americans came to realize Turkey's firm determination to rid itself of its minority populations, including the
Greeks of Constantinople, while in the same breath alluding to a mutually beneficial business arrangement
between Turkey and the United States. This would not be the only instance during the Conference that Turkish
delegates would attempt to garner American favor with offers of economic privileges, yet this particular moment
best embodies how economic interests and the American perspective on the minorities, including population
exchange, were discussed in the same forum and influenced one another.
During the first discussion on the exchange on December 1, when the Conference had invited the American
delegation to join the exchange sub-commission, they had declined, stating that "this question did not concern us
[the United States] and that after the arrangement is concluded we can participate in question of protection of
such minorities as may be left."[46] Critically, the United States' delegates experienced a change of heart and
decided that from December 4, an American representative should attend the meetings of the exchange subcommission. They explained to Washington, rather cryptically, that this diplomatic about face was taken "on
account of the tendency of these meetings to take unexpected turns."[47] At the same time the Americans joined
the sub-commission, the Greek delegation was on the verge of reluctantly agreeing to Constantinople's inclusion in
the exchange. In a "hot discussion," Turkish delegates refused to release Greek civilian prisoners unless the Greek
delegation agreed to a compulsory exchange that included not only all of Anatolia, but Constantinople as well.[48]
While the American representatives listened silently during this and the next exchange meeting as the Turkish
delegates browbeat the Greeks over Constantinople even to point of alluding to renewed hostilities, they were not
likely endeared to the Turkish delegation's attempts to impose this "exchange". For the American perspective, the
continued expulsion of Greeks from Turkey would only exacerbate a humanitarian crisis and there remained the
possibility the expulsions could lead to the emigration of a large number of Greeks to the United States.[49]
However, the Americans pursued both "idealist and commercial" concerns at the conference and bore in mind the
political reality of their position.[50] Resisting the compulsory exchange as a whole would likely cause no change in
policy, as Turkey was already forcibly expelling its Greek population from Anatolia as the Conference convened,
yet would incense Turkish delegates and thereby jeopardize future American business interests in that
country.[51] Also having been untouched by the conflict and then under Allied occupation, the American
delegation likely realized Constantinople provided perhaps the only area under nominal Turkish rule where Turkey
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could be persuaded to allow the Greeks to remain if the Americans chose to participate in the exchange's
negotiations. Therefore, on December 7, the American delegation issued a statement arguing for the exemption of
only the Constantinople Greeks from the exchange rather than the whole Greek population of Turkey. Prompted
by a request from the Chairman of the sub-commission for the American perspective on the topic, Ambassador
Joseph Grew replied that
"the American delegation is not in accord with proposals for a new compulsory movement of populations
unless it is clearly shown that good purpose will be servedwhere the exchange is necessary to serve
humanitarian ends. Without discrimination between the parties to the negotiation for exchange, the
American delegation is unable to approve the movement from Constantinople."[52]
The British and other allied delegates quickly declared their support of this statement and the Americans reported
home that the Turkish delegates, "apparently impressed," requested three days time to make their reply.[53]
This statement served as America's most direct and influential contribution to the population transfer discussion.
The American delegation expressed opposition to Constantinople's inclusion, but a willingness to accept the
greater compulsory exchange so long as a "good purpose will be served."[54] In Washington, Grew's statement
delighted Secretary of State Hughes. He personally telegraphed the American delegation to inform them of his
approval and quoted Grew's words verbatim, the same as are quoted above, in a memorandum to President
Harding. At the end of his account to the president, Hughes wrote, "I feel that Mr. Grew has correctly interpreted
American sentiment and American policy in this statement."[55] At the highest levels of American foreign policy
making, there was strong support for the exclusion of Constantinople, but a tacit acceptance of the principle of
forced population transfer in general.
Despite expressed British support in the exchange sub-commission, the American delegation remained the real
author of Constantinople's exemption. Without the American initiative, it is unlikely that the British would have
objected to the removal of Constantinople's Greeks. They had listened for days to the Turkish delegation
pressuring the Greeks without objection.[56] Further, many in the Turkish delegation at Lausanne and the Turkish
population at large like Secretary Hughes believed the British had used the Greeks as proxies during the recent
Greco-Turk War and sought to expand British imperial influence in Asia Minor.[57] British delegates were
disinclined to make any independent statement supporting Greeks then under Turkish rule as it would have been
construed as another underhanded British attack on Turkish sovereignty, and this would have upset Curzon's
greater efforts and interests in the main commission such as the Straits. Possibly to avoid such an occurrence,
Curzon had informed American diplomats earlier during the conference that the British delegation would support
any position the American delegates took on minority rights and had expressed his belief that population exchange
was a minority's issue.[58]
While the Turkish delegates had requested three days to prepare a response, the sub-commission would have to
wait until December 12, five days, for their reply. This was not unusual, as delaying or ignoring a matter were
common tactics used by the Turkish delegation throughout the conference when discussions seemed to favor their
opponents.[59] On the morning of December 12, Turkish representative Rizanour Bey stated in response to
American and allied views, that the Turkish delegation had decided to adopt "a conciliatory spirit by allowing [the]
Constantinople Greeks to remain."[60] The timing of this concession is critical for historians to note as Turkish
delegates agreed to exclude Constantinople from the exchange only after Ambassador Grew's statement on
December 7 and before Curzon and Venizelos would address the exchange in a later discussion on December 12.
This combined with the fact the intermediary period of five days from December 7 to December 12 1922,
possessed no formal discussions on the exchange at the Conference displays there is a direct causation between
the American statement and Turkish consent to exempt Constantinople from the exchange.
A recent historian, Onur Yıldırım, argues in Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange
of Populations, 1922-1934 the critical "turning point in the [exchange's] negotiations, [was] the agreement on the
exemption of the Greeks of Constantinople."[61] He also contends that during the Conference, Curzon and
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Venizelos played lead roles in convincing the Turkish delegation to exempt Constantinople from the population
exchange in contrast to this thesis.[62] As the most direct support of his claim, he cites that an ultimatum from
Curzon to the Turkish delegation, which Venizelos supported, forced Constantinople's exemption. The discussion in
question took place in the afternoon December 12 meeting of the main commission as he writes
Curzon combined the two problems to propose that "the Greek government is prepared to leave alone
[the Muslims of Western Thrace] if the population of Constantinople is also left undisturbed If no such
arrangement can be arrived at, then they also will be turned out, and there will be no Turkish population
in Western Thrace for whom provision will be required." Venizelos seconded Curzon's proposal without
any hesitation. The Turkish delegation, which had vehemently argued for the complete uprooting of the
Greeks from Constantinople, adopted thenceforward a more reconciling attitude.'[63]
In fact, the Turkish delegation had already conceded to American-led diplomatic pressure earlier that morning on
December 12 in the exchange sub-commission to exempt Constantinople.[64] Curzon himself hints at this later in
the speech Yıldırım cited and in his daily report back to London, however the scathing response Curzon's
proposition received from İsmet İnn, head of the Turkish delegation, best suggests the Turkish delegates had
previously agreed to Constantinople's exemption. When given an opportunity to reply, İnn stated that "as the
Turkish delegation had [already] acquiesced in the demand for the maintenance of the Greek population of
Constantinople," Curzon's implicit threat once more demonstrated how the Turkish people's magnanimity "always
recoiled to their disadvantage."[65] Curzon's statement and Venizelos's backing were not then, as Yıldırım claims,
the cause of Turkish consent to the exemption of the Constantinople Greeks but rather American Ambassador
Joseph Grew's earlier statement on December 7.
The communiqus of İsmet İnn back to the Turkish Assembly also suggested that American influence led to the
exemption of the Constantinople Greeks. As head of the Turkish delegation, İnn early on in the conference
reported to Ankara he felt that "with the participation of the Americans in the discussions on such issues as
minorities and Christians, I guess, we will face great difficulties."[66] İnn also hoped during the Conference to
separate the exchange issue from other minority questions, especially the fate of the Armenians. In another
telegram, he stated that "I think it is not possible to justify to the world the expulsion of the Armenians I have to
conduct negotiations with the American representatives and the Armenian delegation on this ground, and [try] to
isolate the Greeks [from the other minorities]."[67] Concerned with only the American stance on the exchange
rather than Greek or British perspectives, İnn and rest of the Turkish delegation worried American criticism of
Constantinople's inclusion could have amalgamated with other American objections to Turkey's minority policy
and led to a diplomatic rift. In order to prevent such an occurrence, the Turkish delegation calculated to pacify
American sentiment by agreeing to exclude the Constantinople Greeks as Turkey needed American goodwill both
to implement the larger exchange without great international embarrassment and to encourage future American
investment, which they actively pursued during the Conference, in order to revitalize their devastated country.[68]
In the exchange sub-commission on the same morning of December 12, emboldened by American support for
Constantinople's exclusion, Greek delegates proposed that the whole concept of a compulsory exchange be
abandoned.[69] Yet later that afternoon, American delegate Richard Child reiterated American acceptance of the
compulsory nature of the larger exchange. Child had gained notoriety during the Conference for his excessive
idealism, which Curzon felt gave his diplomacy a "Childish" character.[70] Yet, privately, Child felt that a population
exchange would be of "greater value than all the treaty guarantees ever written" and expressed distaste when
minority groups sought American support.[71] He publicly declared on December 12 that a "wise exchange of
nationals" could allow families to be reunited and "separation" as well could serve to protect the welfare of
minorities. However, in the same speech he warned "that new precedents which tend to establish the right of
nations to expel large bodies of their citizens must be considered before countenance is given to them lest a new
and unwholesome principle find foothold to vex international law and justice."[72] While Child subtly conceded to
American acceptance of the compulsory population exchange, he also vocalized American discomfort with the
concept's obligatory nature and fear of its misuse, which the Greeks the next day wrongly interpreted as a
rejection of compulsory exchange altogether. The next morning, in the exchange sub-commission, Greek delegates
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"referring to Child's statement of yesterday inquired whether the Turks were ready to renounce principle of
obligation exchange."[73] It is a great irony then when the Greek delegation would implore the Turkish delegates
to renounce the use of an obligatory exchange citing Child's statement, the American delegation remained silent
and unwilling to support Greece's efforts which ultimately ended any real further discussion on the question on a
voluntary exchange.[74] The American delegation in broad terms justified this course of action to Washington as
implementing a half way policy where
"if we adopt as attitude of willingness to admit the changed situation of the Turkish nation, and by
utilizing this friendly attitude (of the Turks towards the United States) and the fact that the leading classes
in Turkey hope for very considerable investment of American capital into their country and would like to
encourage such investment, we should be able to secure for our interests in Turkey more favorable
conditions than if we opposed the Turkish aspirations during a long period and then in the end have to
accept them. At the same time, besides gaining some positive advantages for our own interests, we
should strengthen our position with the Turkish governing classes and thus be able to do more at this
time for the minorities, by taking the lead in stating to the Turks that we are ready to meet them half
way."[75]
The American delegation reasoned that by not resisting the compulsory nature of the exchange which eventually
they would probably be forced to accept anyway due to facts on the ground, this would encourage future
"favorable conditions" for American economic interests and ultimately place America in an advantageous
diplomatic position to improve the lot of minorities in Turkey.
On January 31, 1923, during the presentation of the final draft treaty of the Exchange Convention, Ambassador
Child reaffirmed the American position with respect to Constantinople and the compulsory nature of the
population exchange. In his speech he credited the United States during the Conference with having "spoke[n]
against the expulsion of populations when these appeared to menace human beings with suffering and with
injustice," a subtle allusion to Ambassador Grew's statement against the proposed removal of the Constantinople
Greeks. Further, he absolved the United States of responsibility for the population exchange, calling it a "joint
action" and justified silent American consent to its compulsory nature stating "that unparalleled suffering should
be prevented and relieved" thereby.[76]
Present during the Conference as a correspondent, Ernest Hemingway wrote the diplomats at Lausanne, "They All
Made Peace-[but] What Is Peace?"[77] Peace, for many on both sides of the Aegean, meant an exchange
convention now sanctioned the expulsion from their homes. Signed on January 30, 1923 by both Turkey and
Greece, the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations formalized the transfer of 1.5
million Greeks and 400,000 Turks, which did in fact exempt Constantinople.[78] In contrast to the works of
historian Onur Yıldırım, this thesis concludes neither British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon nor the leading Greek
delegate Venizelos contributed greatly to persuading the Turkish delegation to consent to the exclusion of
Constantinople from the population exchange. Curzon and the rest of British delegation had pre-planned and
devoted their diplomatic efforts to ensuring the freedom of the Turkish Straits and other political goals which were
discussed in conjunction with the exchange during the Conference from December 2 to December 12, 1922.
Having to balance the threat of continued hostilities and managing the foreign affairs of an empire severely
weakened by the Great War, Curzon pragmatically chose not use to Britain's finite diplomatic clout on an issue
that paid no direct dividends to Great Britain. Instead, Curzon expended only rhetoric on the question of the
exchange and Constantinople's fate and given that Curzon, as head of the Conference, determined that the Straits
and exchange would be discussed simultaneously and directed the British delegates in the exchange subcommission, British focus on the Straits issue and inaction in the exchange sub-commission surrounding
Constantinople should be attributed ultimately to him. Simultaneously, Venizelos and the Greek delegation
continuously and adamantly opposed the compulsory nature and inclusion of Constantinople throughout the
conference, hoping to minimize the refugee crisis Greece was then experiencing. However, possessing little
political strength, Venizelos and the rest of the Greek delegates could do little more than express Greek positions
and then look to the Allies and America for support in actually persuading the Turkish delegation to compromise or
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concede on a diplomatic point. This was particularly evident during discussions in the exchange sub-commission
when Greece and Turkey engaged one on one negotiations and Turkey continuously refused to compromise its
position until the United States intervened on the question of Constantinople. The exemption of Constantinople
then, despite Greek resistance to its inclusion would not have occurred without America's diplomatic contribution
since Greece, reeling from its defeat in the Greco-Turk War, could do little but eventually accept the dictations set
by Turkey at Lausanne. For its part, the Turkish delegation headed by İsmet İnn concerned itself little with Greek
st
and British objections to the exchange on December 1 and conceded to Constantinople's exemption out of
political expediency for fear of losing American favor necessary for later economic development rather than a
spirit of reconciliation.[79] Determined to ensure the welfare of the Turkish people, the Turkish delegation saw the
removal of minorities, Greeks in particular, as a national necessity, making the Turkish delegation staunch
supporters of the exchange's compulsory nature.
For the United States, the possibility of Greek refugees arriving on America's shores and perhaps the sincere
humanitarian concerns motivated Admiral Mark Bristol and Ambassadors Richard Child and Joseph Grew to insist
on Constantinople's exemption from the exchange, but economic concerns and a desire to acquire Turkish
goodwill led America not to resist the greater exchange's compulsory nature. Having taken an interest in the
welfare of the Greek population of Turkey in the past these delegates tempered their precedent of intervention
and defending Greeks under Turkish rule by recognizing the intransigence of the Turkish delegation on the
question of minorities. While at first unwilling to join the exchange sub-commission, the Americans, whose
eventual change of heart would lead to a statement issued by Ambassador Grew on December 7, 1922, led Turkey
to agree to Constantinople's exemption. Attempts during the conference by the Greek delegation to enact a
voluntary population exchange rather than compulsory one would be met with silence by the Americans, implying
a tacit acceptance for the principle of compulsion which the Americans described as their "half way" policy. While
st
the 1 Lausanne Conference failed to produce a final peace treaty between Turkey, Greece, and the Allies, the
American delegation congratulated itself for having "spoken against the expulsion of populations."[80]
Unfortunately, the convention and American intervention granted the Greeks of Constantinople a temporary
reprieve as state-sponsored pogroms in the 1950's would later remove the almost the entire Greek population
from the city. Notably, the final draft also stipulated an exchange based on religion rather than ethnicity, showing
that despite the rise of nationalism, a concept of identity defined by religious affiliation, that's roots lay in the
th
former Ottoman millet system still lived on into the 20 century.[81]Yet for the international community, the
Turco-Greek Exchange Convention served a legal veneer for later forced ethnic-based population movements in
Europe implemented by totalitarian regimes, for which America must share some responsibility.
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